July Newsletter

and May 2006 newsletters related to the court’s jurisdiction pursuant to Title 18 of the Federal Code. Interestingly enough, we have seen lawyers threatened, we have seen judges hold fake hearings with Petitioner’s “present” when they were actually 2,000 miles away (then the docket sheet records disappeared-don’t worry, we have copies), we have seen federal prosecutors commit perjury and fraud, and we have seen federal judges act in treason against the Constitution. The Constitution was formed by “We the people”, not “We the government”. As you will learn in future newsletters, since the 1930s the government has taken actions by executive order which places the courts under the control of the Department of Justice, and in violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine. “We the people” never agreed to that, and it is nowhere to be found in the Constitution. If you want relief from your illegal confinement, contact us.

What we will do in this newsletter is detail the reasons Title 18 is void ab initio (from the beginning). Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine preavia lege poenali. (No crime [may be committed], no punishment [may be imposed] without a previous penal law. In the next newsletter we will outline the responses you will see from the government and court and how worthless and nonsensical they are. Please remember the briefs are copyrighted and they must be properly argued to obtain relief.

The research done by our firm establishes several prongs, any one of which shows that Title 18 is a nullity, void from its inception: Please remember that the briefs are copyrighted, therefore, you are not allowed to use them without our permission, and that you must be ready for the responses you will receive and must know how to deal with them. Each prong is an independent argument (“Nothwithstanding the above”).

(1) The two houses of the Congress passed the same numbered bill, one house in the first session of Congress and the second house in the second session of the same Congress (the two sessions being separated by a sine die intersession adjournment, Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 444, Appendix, FN 4, 5). Specifically, it is unconstitutional (or illegal) for the House of Representatives to pass H.R. 3190 in 1947 (in the First Session of the 80^th Congress) and for the Senate to pass it in 1948 (in the Second Session of the 80^th Congress), without the House passing it once again in the Second Session).,

(2) An H.R. bill cannot be first passed by the Senate before it is passed by the House of Representatives. Specifically, the fact that the House of Representatives concurred in the Senate amendments (on June 18, 1948), after the Senate passed the amended H.R. 3190) did not cure the problem.

(3) It is unconstitutional for the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate to sign an enrolled bill after the final adjournment of the Congress (not in open session). Specifically, it is unconstitutional for the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate to sign H.R. 3190 on June 22, and June 23, 1948, respectively, after the final adjournment of the 80^th Congress on June 20, 1948.

(4) The above-referenced (3) is unconstitutional even in light of the House Concurrent Resolution 219, which both houses passed on June 19, 1948, to authorize (3), because President Truman never had to sign H.Con.Res. 219.

(5) The above-referenced (3) is also illegal under 1 U.S.C. § 101, which states “BE IT ENACTED BY THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN CONGRESS ASSEMBLED.” Despite the fact that both houses of the 80^th Congress passed H.Con.Res. 219 to authorize the above-referenced (3) because a House Concurrent Resolution does not require the President’s signature and, thus, cannot override (invalidate) 1 U.S.C. § 101.

(6) The House of Representatives never voted on the amended bill that the Senate passed on June 18, 1948. Thus, even if we assume that there is no problem with the House of Representatives passing H.R. 3190 in the First Session (1947) of the 80^th Congress, the problem is still not solved because the Senate amended the bill that the House had passed in 1947. Thus, the House and Senate passed different bills, in violation of the Presentment Clause, Article I, Section 7, of the United States Constitution.

(7) The enrolled bill was altered from the engrossed bill to make it appear that the bill passed both Houses of Congress in the second session of the 80^th Congress, rendering it a fraud and forgery and invalid. Specifically, the enrolled bill must be the same as the engrossed bill, to establish that both houses passed the same bill. The 80^th Congress decided to violate the Separation of Powers Doctrine and falsify the dates on the enrolled bill, rendering it a fraud and forgery and void.

(8) Since Public Law 80-772 (Title 18) was never published in the Federal Register, and is not listed in the Code of Federal Regulations, the public was never properly notified of the law and it is a nullity. See 44 U.S. § 1507 (Pub. L. 90-620,Oct. 22, 1968, 82 Stat. 1276, based on 44 U.S. Code 1964 ed., § 307 (July 26, 1935, ch. 417, § 7, 49 Stat. 502)). In fact, a look at the Code of Federal Regulations under Title 18 shows that it deals with Conservation of Power and Water Resources.

Congress adjourned for 113 days in its first adjournment and for about 2 months in its second adjournment. Lets see what the DOJ thinks about how adjournments over 3 days effect pending legislation.

“’We think that where one House seeks the consent of another House and goes out on a recess for more than 3 days, you have bicameral action, which constitutes an adjournment of Congress’ … ‘the Constitution implies that any adjournment by the Congress – that is, any adjournment of either house for longer than three days – gives occasion for a pocket veto.’ … So we think that part of the rationale for the pocket veto clause was the ducking Congress problem, but there was another reason, which was to eliminate or to minimize periods of uncertainty, to focus the debate… to permit the legislative process to rapidly resolve and immediate address differences that arose between the Executive and Congress.’” “Thus, we believe that the Constitution implicitly defines an adjournment of Congress, which takes place whenever either House goes out for more than 3 days.” (John McGinnis of the Office of Legal Counsel, pocket veto hearing in 1990 before the House Judiciary Committee). See also, Congressional Directory: Definition of Pocket Veto: “ is when the President fails to sign a bill within the 10 days allowed by the Constitution. Congress must be in adjournment in order for a pocket veto to take effect.” See also, U.S. Senate, Definition of Sine Die Adjournment.

Since the DOJ’s official position before Congress supports the fact the statute is a nullity, then they are estopped from arguing otherwise.

When a Petitioner’s claims are jurisdictional in nature they can be raised at any time. No procedural hurdle exists if a court has no jurisdiction over Petitioner. Lack of Article III jurisdiction cannot be waived and cannot be conferred upon a federal district court by consent, by action, or by stipulation. California v. LaRue, 400

U.S.

109, 112, 34 L.Ed. 342, 93 S.Ct. 390 (1972). The validity of an order on sentencing of a federal district court depends upon that court having jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the defendant. Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305

U.S.

171-172, 83 L.Ed 104, 59 S.Ct. 134 (1938). Petitioner’s counsel had a Sixth Amendment right to investigate the facts and law related to the court’s jurisdiction, and since jurisdiction is a threshold matter, the failure of counsel to investigate the facts and law and to know the court’s jurisdiction renders him ineffective as a matter of law.

A district court must obtain its jurisdiction exclusively from the Constitution and statutes of the

United States

. Without a valid statute, it has no jurisdiction except to dismiss the cause. 18 U.S.C. § 3231 is unconstitutional on its face because it is part of the unconstitutional and fraudulent enactment of H.R. 3190 and Public Law 80-772. 18 U.S.C. § 546, the prior 1940 enactment, defined different crimes and carried different penalty provisions, gave the court jurisdiction to prosecute crimes, but jurisdiction only over the crimes in that title. Defendant was not indicted based on any of the crimes in that title, and therefore, his indictment is null and void. Without a valid indictment, no jurisdiction exists to continue Defendant’s illegal incarceration. Nullum Crimen, Sine Lege, Nulla Poena, Sine Lege. NO LAW, NO CRIME.

F.2d 1080, 1081-1082, the court found that at the time the offense occurred and the

accused was indicted, “the state of Delaware had published and was holding out the new

[statute] as its only proscription of such misconduct as the indictment charged.” The

unconstitutional. And by definition, an unconstitutional statute is one that fails to give

fair notice that particular conduct is proscribed by the state. See United States v.

Harris, 1954, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 98 L.Ed. 989, 74 S.Ct. 808; Connally v. General

Construction Co., 1926, 269 U.S. 385, 391, 70 L.Ed. 322, 46 S.Ct. 126. Thus, the state’s

own interpretation of the new statute and its rejection of that section as a statutory basis

for Clark’s prosecution caused the court to hold that the new statute did not provide

The Clark court determined that the defendant’s conviction could be upheld only if the old statute, the supercession of which had been legislatively declared and publicly announced, could continue to serve as notice of the criminality of defendant’s conduct. In order to reach that conclusion the court decided that one would have to reason, first that the new statute on its face gave adequate notice of its own invalidity, and second, that the public, thus informed, was then put on further notice that the officially announced statutory repeal or supercession of the old statute was legally ineffective. Id.

The court concluded that such reasoning was “too tortured and too far removed” from reality to satisfy the due process requirement that, at the time of the alleged offense, the accused shall have been on notice that his conduct was proscribed by the criminal law. The court could not even surmount the first hurdle that the new statute could serve as notice of its own invalidty. Without that notice, no occasion was available to consider the old statute as possibly relevant.

As in the Clark case, and its Supreme Court precedents, to meet Due Process, Public Law 80-772 and 18 U.S.C. § 3231 would have had to give adequate public notice on their faces of their own invalidity and the public would have to have been put on further notice that the officially announced statutory repeal or supercession of the old statutes was legally effective. The court can not even reach the first hurdle, much less the second one. The court obtained its jurisdiction to prosecute crimes pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. Without proper notice of the invalidity of the statute, defendant’s indictment and conviction can not be upheld and the court has only one choice, to order dismissal of defendant’s indictment and conviction ab initio.

Title 18 (Public Law 80-772) is a nullity, void from its inception, as a matter of

Law. Each of the prongs of the argument establish its unconstitutionality as a matter of law. The arguments must be properly presented, and if so, any prong of the argument, establishes the invalidity of the legislation in its own right. In the next newsletters we will show you responses from the Court and government that can only be nonsensical, and show you how to get back into court. Please remember, that this is only one of 7 jurisdictional arguments we have that allow a prisoner to obtain relief.

No vote occurred by the House in 1948, therefore, no law exists. We have the certified records.

Since no vote occurred on the bill in 1948 in the House, according to certified records, it is void ab initio.

Although it never became an issue, theoretically, the power that H.ConRes. 219 gave to the Speaker of the House and to the President pro tempore of the Senate (both Republicans) could have been used to delay the submission of the enrolled bills to President Truman (a Democrat) until, for instance, Truman took a foreign trip (to visit, say some European countries). This hypothetical scenario may have resulted in a constitutional crisis (separation of powers) because the procedure could have been used to bypass the President and to get some of the enrolled bills, which President Truman would have enacted by getting them signed by the Republican House Speaker Joseph W. Martin, who would have acted in lieu of the President because there was no Vice-President between 1945 and 1949, until the inauguration of Alban W. Barkley, who was elected as Truman’s Vice-President in the 1948 elections.

Public Citizen, a Civil Rights Group, has sued the Government, requesting Declaratory Relief and that the law be declared a nullity, because the version of the Elder Care Act passed by the House is different than the one passed by the Senate.